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Aspirational Law
PHILIP HARVEYt
INTRODUCTION
What are "human rights" and what does it mean to say
that someone has them in situations where they are not
enforced? I have never found the standard answers to that
question very satisfying. On the one hand, legal positivists
argue that there is no such thing as an unenforced right. If
a so-called human right is not enforced it isn't a right at all,
but just a moral claim.' On the other hand, human rights
theorists tend to rest their case for the existence of such
rights on philosophical or theological arguments that ignore
the enforcement issue.' For lack of a better term, I shall
refer to these justifications collectively as the natural rights
argument.
I find both of these arguments useful but incomplete.
The legal positivist argument strikes me as evasive, substituting quibbles over terminology for a real coming to terms
with the nature of human rights claims. Language is a
product of usage, and definitions (even in legal theory)
should not ignore usage. People consistently use the term
t Associate Professor of Law and Economics, Rutgers School of Law-Camden.

1. This view was famously expressed in the following comments by Jeremy
Bentham objecting to the rights talk of the French Revolution:
Right, the substantive right, is the child of law: from real laws come
real rights; but from laws of nature, fancied and invented by poets,
rhetoriticians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons come
imaginary rights, a bastard brood of monsters, 'gorgons and chimeras
dire'.
Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM,
BuRKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 69 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987).
Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights,
rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon stilts.
Id. at 53.
2. For examples of this type of reasoning applied to economic and social
human rights claims, see ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PROGRESS
AND ACHIEVEMENT (Ralph Beddard and Dilys M. Hill eds., 1992).
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"human rights" in a way that connotes a special category of
entitlements that is distinct from other moral claims and
that may, under certain circumstances, be more authoritative than mere legal rights. Who are the positivists to say
that this usage is mistaken? Was it simply a linguistic mistake to assert that apartheid violated the human rights of
non-white South Africans or for Thomas Jefferson to assert
that "all men are created equal"? I don't think so. The usage
is too widespread and, more importantly, too consequential
to be dismissed as confused. Something special and unique
is going on when people assert or accept the existence of
unenforced human rights that is not adequately captured in
the positivist distinction between legal rights and moral
claims.
On the other hand, I think the natural rights argument
confuses justification with explanation. That a particular
human right may be philosophically justified is important,
but it doesn't explain when it is reasonable to assert that
such rights exist or what it means to assert that a person
possesses such a right if it is not enforced. These issues,
concerning which the positivist argument is at least clear if
narrowly dogmatic, tend not to be addressed at all by the
natural rights argument. Surely it is not sufficient to claim
that a particular right exists just because it can be justified
within a particular philosophical framework, irrespective of
whether anyone agrees with it or is willing to fight to
achieve its enforcement. At any rate, I'm enough of a legal
positivist to think that something more than logic is
required to support the existence of human rights.
Given my dissatisfaction with both the legal positivist
and the natural rights arguments, I find myself in the
awkward position of believing strongly in the existence of
human rights-including unenforced human rightswithout having a very clear notion of what that means or
what gives people the "right" to claim that they possess
such rights. In this essay I want to explore an idea I have
been turning over in my mind that may resolve the
difficulties I see in the legal positivist and natural rights
arguments. I'm not sure the idea will withstand close
scrutiny or that other people will find it any more satisfying
than I find the positivist and natural rights explanations,
but I think it does explain the special character of
unenforced human rights as a form of what I refer to as
"aspirational law."
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I. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS

People go to law school for a variety of reasons. In my
case it was an interest in economic and social human
rights-though interest is really too mild a term. In the late
1970s and early 1980s I was a socially engaged left-wing
economist teaching in a Third World studies program after
completing a degree at the Graduate Faculty of the New
School for Social Research, a place that prided itself on its
transnational origins and internationalist perspective. Still,
I had never heard of the economic and social provisions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Indeed, I was
only dimly aware of the existence of the Universal
Declaration itself and, like most Americans, assumed that
the U.S. Bill of Rights was more or less synonymous with
everyone's conception of human rights.
This assumption was profoundly limiting. I had been
schooled by the decolonization, Civil Rights, anti-war, and
women's movements to appreciate the importance of rightsbased claims in mobilizing social protest and achieving
social reform. I admired the power of equal entitlement
arguments but assumed that they had to be grounded on
claims of invidious discrimination, either present or historical. I never dreamed that authoritative recognition had ever
been accorded the idea that freedom from poverty and
unemployment, access to health care and education, and a
variety of other social entitlements could be claimed as
human rights in and of themselves-irrespective of whether
particular individuals or groups had been denied equal
access to the benefits in question.
I learned of the economic and social provisions of the
Universal Declaration (see Appendix) while doing educational consulting work for a church organization. I was
stunned by the discovery and instantly accepted the truth
of what the Universal Declaration proclaimed. It was a
Eureka moment for me. It not only put a name to what I
always had felt was wrong with market societies; it
provided a conceptual framework for my work as an economist.
Markets are engines of technological innovation, economic growth, consumer autonomy, and certain kinds of
economic efficiency; but they are not very good at securing
the economic and social entitlements proclaimed to be
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human rights in the Universal Declaration. They do not
ensure that all members of society will be able to find
decent work; they do not protect people who are unable to
earn their own livelihood from impoverishment; and they do
not distribute health care and education based on need and
equitable entitlement. Other institutions, guided by nonmarket values, are needed to secure these entitlements for
all persons.
I therefore came to view economic and social human
rights as having a similar relationship to the market
mechanism that minority rights have to majority rule. Just
as strong safeguards for minority rights are needed to
ensure that majority rule does not produce unacceptable
political outcomes, so too strong safeguards for economic
and social human rights are needed to ensure that the
market mechanism does not produce unacceptable social
outcomes. To recognize the entitlements included in the
Universal Declaration as human rights means that societies
have an obligation to secure them and that this
goal
"trumps" other economic policy goals.
In methodological terms, this explained the shortcomings of neo-classical economics in a way that situated the
issue squarely within long-standing philosophical debates
concerning the adequacy of utilitarianism as a social choice
criterion. Neo-classical economic theory is founded on a
double embrace of the concept of utility maximization.
First, its positive model of economic institutions-indeed,
its conception of what the study of "economics" properly
encompasses-is founded on the assumption that the "economic" behavior (i.e., the revealed preferences) of both
individuals and entities can be treated as an independent
variable embodying the traits of rationality, possessive
individualism and, most importantly, utility maximization.
Second, it normatively assumes that utility maximization
(actually the satisfaction of revealed preferences since utility cannot be directly measured) is the proper goal of both
individual economic behavior and of the economy as a
whole. The result is a discipline that asks no more of the
economy than that it maximize the satisfaction of people's
self-regarding desires-hence the lionization of the market
mechanism, an institution preeminently suited to achieving
that goal. The promotion of other goals that may impact
economic policy is viewed as a legitimate undertaking
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within this framework, but it is by definition a noneconomic activity.
The existence of economic and social human rights has
profound implications for both positive and normative economics. On the normative side, the recognition of economic
and social human rights poses a fundamental challenge to
the adequacy of the utility maximization norm. The potential for conflict between utility maximization and human
rights protection has long been recognized in the social
choice literature, but the practical implications of this theoretical possibility are greatly increased if economic and
social entitlements are recognized as human rights. Theoretical discussions of the potential conflict between utility
maximization and human rights protection tend to feature
unrealistic scenarios that are unlikely to arise in the real
world-for example, the possibility that a society of Nazis
would derive more utility in the aggregate from persecuting
a minority group living in their midst than the minority
group would lose in the aggregate from the consequent
violations of their human rights.
Utilitarians can and do dismiss scenarios such as these
as so implausible that they do not call into question the
practical adequacy of the utility maximization norm. It is
not at all implausible, though, to imagine such scenarios
involving the violation of economic and social human rights.
Securing such rights may require policies that raise taxes,
increase the size and regulatory activities of government,
and are likely to increase inflationary pressures in the
economy. A large majority of the population of a market
society could easily feel a strong enough preference for
lower taxes, smaller government, and reduced inflation that
the aggregate utility they derive from neo-liberal economic
policies will exceed the disutility suffered by the minority of
the population whose 3 economic and social rights are violated by those policies.
This possibility is further amplified in neo-classical
assessments of public policy choices, since the treatment of
revealed preferences as a stand-in for utility, combined with
the abandonment of any effort to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, leaves neo-classical economists no
3. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Philip Harvey, Human
Human
Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social
(2002).
363
REV.
L.
RTS.
HUM.
COLUM.
33
Rights Seriously,
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practical choice but to assume that the satisfaction of majoritarian preferences is utility maximizing. If a majority of
the population reveal their preference for lower taxes by
reducing or terminating public assistance benefits for poor
families, a neo-classical economist has no grounds for
assuming the decision is anything but utility-maximizingthereby creating a direct conflict between the utility maximization norm and the claim that the policy violates the
economic and social human rights of the affected families.
The implications of the existence of economic and social
human rights for positive economic analysis is more subtle
but equally profound. As noted above, neo-classical
economic theory treats the structure and intensity of individual preferences as an independent variable properly
constrained only by efficiency maximizing legal rules and
market forces. As long as those legal rules are "efficient" in
the utility-maximizing (or wealth-maximizing) sense of the
term, the model works well. The legal rules require no
change in behavioral assumptions because they are
designed (or should be designed) to eliminate only those
behaviors that tend to reduce aggregate utility (e.g., unremedied breaches of contract). That's the whole point of neoclassical law and economics scholarship. But what if the
legal rules constraining individual preferences include
economic and social human rights obligations that may not
be utility maximizing? The problem this poses for positive
neo-classical analysis may not be great as long as it is
assumed that the law constrains behavior but does not
affect individual preferences. Then you could use neo-classical analysis to explain economic outcomes in the same way
it is used today to describe the effects of "inefficient" legal
rules. Normative judgments concerning the desirability of
those outcomes would be affected, but not the positive
analysis of the outcomes themselves. Recognizing, though,
that one purpose of the law is to shape preferences (thereby
reducing enforcement costs), neo-classical economics would
have to face the possibility that homo economicus might
have to be replaced in their economic model with a less selfcentered being who may not behave in accord with the
model's assumptions.
What would a neo-classical model look like in which
business firms could not be presumed to be profit-maximizing or in which consumers manifested significant
concern for the well-being of others as well as for their own?
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To concretize this problem, ask yourself what a neoclassical model of the economics of family life would look
like-not the family's economic dealings with the rest of the
world but their economic dealings with one another. How
are decisions made about who will engage in which productive activities within the household? How are goods and
services that come into the family's possession shared
among its members? How are less productive or incapacitated members of the family cared for and supported? While
neo-classical economists like Gary Becker have famously
attempted to model some familial decisions, nothing
approaching a comprehensive neo-classical model of the
family has ever been attempted precisely because the neoclassical methodology depends on behavioral assumptions
that do not adequately capture the motivations that drive
economic behavior in that context.
Energized by both the normative attractiveness of the
economic and social human rights norms recognized in the
Universal Declaration and the political potential I saw in
promoting social reform using the language of human
rights, I began to conceive of my work as an economist as
the design of socio-economic institutions and policies capable of securing economic and social human rights at
smallest sacrifice of economic performance defined in neoclassical terms. That was my definition of economic
efficiency,4 and one of the first questions I asked myself was
whether and how a market society could secure the right to
work for all job-seekers. I began my first serious research
on that subject in the fall of 1984 and decided at the same
time to go to law school. Given the rights orientation of the
research I was undertaking, I thought I needed some legal
training.
Thus I arrived at law school in the fall of 1985 expecting to pursue what I thought of as a career in law and
economics research. Talk about culture shock. I discovered
that what passed for economic analysis in legal scholarship
was even more conservative and constrained by neo-classical assumptions than the work of most neo-classical
4. Efficiency is an engineering concept defined simply as output divided by
input. Miles per hour, miles per gallon, dollars per hour and dollars per gallon
in
are all measures of efficiency. They simply define what they are interested
(or
maximizing and/or minimizing differently. Maximizing aggregate output
utility) while minimizing costs of production is similarly just one of many
possible definitions of economic efficiency.
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economists. I also discovered that most liberal legal scholarship was as innocent of economic and social rights talk as
my own thinking had been a few years earlier (with the
limited exception of by-then abandoned discussions of a
possible constitutional right to "welfare"). Finally, I discovered that "left" legal scholarship tended to be hostile to
"rights talk" because of its presumed jurisprudential implications. The good news was that the field of studies
wanted to pursue-the law and economics of the right toI
work-was open to me. I could pursue my interest without
stepping on anyone's toes. The bad news was the same as
the good: The field was open to me because no one else was
interested in it.
In retrospect, I realize that the smart thing to do would
have been to redirect my work to issues that were being
debated at the time, either in the law and economics literature or the human rights literature. But, feeling like a kid
in a candy shop, I pursued my own research agenda, producing a book and a series of articles on the subject of the
right to work that hardly anyone has read and that absolutely no one has felt compelled to answer.5
One of the issues that I could have pursued if I had followed a wiser course would have been the jurisprudential
foundations of human rights law-including the topic I am
belatedly addressing in this essay. I was aware from early
on, of course, that economic and social human rights claims
have been criticized on the grounds that the so-called rights
at issue are not enforceable. Indeed, my first law-related article, written as a course paper in a law school course on

5. See, e.g., PHILIP HARVEY, SECURING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT:
SOCIAL
WELFARE POLICY AND THE UNEMPLOYED IN THE UNITED
STATES (1989); Philip

Harvey, Combating Joblessness: An Analysis of the Principal Strategies
that
Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and
Social Welfare
Law During the 20th Century, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677
(2000); Philip
Harvey, Direct Job Creation, in COMMITMENT TO
FULL EMPLOYMENT:
MACROECONOMICS AND SOCIAL POLICY IN MEMORY OF WILLIAM
VICKREY 35-54

(Aaron Warner et al. eds., 2000); Philip Harvey, Joblessness and
the Law Before
the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); Philip Harvey,
Liberal
Strategies for Combating Joblessness in the Twentieth Century,
33 J. ECON.
ISSUES 497 (1999); Philip Harvey, Fashioning A Work-Based
Strategy for
Welfare Reform Based on International Human Rights Doctrine,
16 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL'Y 269 (1995); Philip Harvey, Paying for Full Employment:
A HardNosed Look at Finances,25 SOC. POL'Y 21 (1995); Harvey, supra
note 4.
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6
Human Rights, addressed the enforcement issue. Still, it is
not a topic to which I have devoted much attention since
then.

II. UNENFORCED HUMAN RIGHTS

The Universal Declaration makes no distinctions
among the different rights it recognizes, but it is not a
treaty, and at the time of its adoption the prevailing view
was that it did not impose legally enforceable obligations on
individual governments. In contrast, the treaties that were
subsequently promulgated to permit governments to accept
such obligations do distinguish between civil and political
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural
rights, on the other hand. Governments that ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the
ICCPR) incur an obligation to secure most of the rights recognized in the Covenant immediately; but governments
that ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR) generally commit themselves only to work toward the realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant.
For legal positivists, this difference is crucial. Since
unenforced rights are not rights at all according to this
view, it can be argued that the economic and social rights
recognized in the ICESCR are not rights at all. Nations that
ratify the agreement are obligated to promote the achievement of the rights it proclaims, but they don't promise to
secure them; so even if the promotional obligation were
taken seriously, it creates no enforceable entitlement to the
promoted rights themselves.
This defect could be cured, of course, if the rights recognized in the ICESCR were made fully and immediately
enforceable, but even strong advocates of economic and
social rights express doubt that this would be possible for
all the entitlements recognized in the document. This skepticism is expressed most frequently with respect to the right
to work.
In a passionately argued plea for the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government to recognize a

6. Philip Harvey, Monitoring Mechanisms for International Agreements
Respecting Economic and Social Human Rights, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 396 (1987).
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"constitutional right of access to work,"7 Kenneth Karst

nevertheless argues that the right cannot and should not be
made judicially enforceable because of the "superabundance
of causes for the harm of joblessness in today's economy."
His point is that "[t]his diffusion of responsibility seriously
complicates not only the identification of particular defendants and the crafting of judicial remedies, but also the
definition of the wrong."'
Similar views have been expressed by Albie Sachs, a
South African human-rights advocate who helped draft the
economic and social provisions of the post-apartheid South
African Constitution and now sits on the country's Supreme
Court. Sachs has noted that "[i]n drafting the section [of the
South African Constitution] on social rights, we looked to
the International Covenant [on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights]." He went on to observe that "[a]ll of the
rights contained in this section [of the Constitution] are
fully justiciable," including rights to education and health
care. Nevertheless, "[w]e did not include the right to work
in our draft Bill, because we are not sure that anyone, including Mandela, can guarantee full employment within a
satisfactory time period. The government's failure to deliver
full employment would demean the entire document.
Instead, we placed a duty on the state to reduce unemployment. " '
As a final example, Cass Sunstein offers the following
comment in a recent book in which he endorses Franklin D.
Roosevelt's proposed "Second Bill of Rights," a predecessor
and source of the economic and social provisions included in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The first entitlement enumerated in FDR's proposed bill of rights was
"t]he right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation." ° In
discussing the enforceability of FDR's proposed set of
rights, Sunstein argues that
7. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 523, 553 (1997).
8. Id. at 554-55.
9. Symposium, Economic and Social Rights and the Right to Health, at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/Publications/economic2.html
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2004).
10. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 11, 1944), in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, at 41 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
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With respect to judicial enforcement, the difficulty with the second
bill does not lie in ambiguity or vagueness but in the limited
resources of government and the extreme difficulty of ensuring
that the rights in the second bill are respected in practice .... No
that every citizen has a job; a certain level of
nation can ensure
is inevitable.c
unemployment

I think this skepticism concerning the feasibility of
securing the right to work is unwarranted, 2 but I will not
argue that point now, because the premise of these comments-that at least some of the economic and social rights
recognized in the Universal Declaration are not only legally
unenforceable but may be practically unenforceable-will
be useful to my inquiry.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF POSITIVIST CATEGORIES
How should we view the unenforced and possibly unenforceable "rights" proclaimed in documents like the
Universal Declaration and the ICESCR? As mentioned
above, I think the positivist answer to this question fails to
come to terms with the special character of human rights
claims. To explore this issue, consider the distinction that
Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein draw between "moral
rights" and "legal rights."'3 Legal rights, in their view, are
essentially what Bentham refers to as "real rights," that is,
rights which are recognized and enforced by a governing
authority. The category of moral rights is broader. It
includes many legal rights, but it also includes unenforced
moral claims that are triable only before "the tribunal of
conscience." 4 Also consistent with Bentham's position,
moral rights that do not have the status of legal rights are
presumed inferior to legal rights. Bentham called them
"imaginary." Holmes and Sunstein call them "toothless":
When they are not backed by legal force... moral rights are
toothless by definition. Unenforced moral rights are aspirations
binding on conscience, not powers binding on officials. They

11. CASS

R.

SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS:

REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER

12. See generally HARVEY, SECURING
13. STEPHEN HOLMES AND CASS
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAxES

14. Id.

R.

FDR's

UNFINISHED

210 (2004).

THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT, supra note 6.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY

16-17 (1999).
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impose moral duties on all mankind, not legal obligations
on the
15
inhabitants of a territorially bounded nation-state.
In practice, rights become more than mere declarations only if
they confer power on bodies whose decisions are legally binding (as
the moral rights announced in the United Nations
Declaration of
16
Human Rights of 1948, for example, do not).

One of the problems with the application of this distinction
to human rights claims is its absolutism. It treats enforceability as though it were a switch with only two positionson or off. Reality is far more complicated. For example, do
African Americans have the legal right to attend integrated
schools in the United States, and if so, at what point in time
did they obtain that right? The Supreme Court declared
that segregated schools were unconstitutional in 1954, but
it did not order an immediate end to the practice, and it
also did not explain what kinds of segregation were unlawful. School desegregation litigation addressed these issues
over the next several decades, and a complex set of rules
evolved for the enforcement of the Court's original order.
But it would take a roomful of experts to explain what those
rules are, and even then the practical enforceability of the
rules depends on a range of other factors such as how much
money a potential plaintiff has to spend on legal fees, the
current state of public opinion, and even the identity of the
judge to whom a case is assigned. If we define "legal rights"
as those "backed by legal force," then an accurate answer to
the question of whether African Americans have the legal
right to attend integrated schools must be that "It depends."
To cite another example, do American workers have the
legal right to organize a union without being fired? If the
answer to that question depends on whether workers fired
for their union activities can obtain a back pay order
"backed by legal force," the answer is probably yes, but if it
depends on whether they can obtain an effective remedy for
the violation of their right to organize a union, the answer
is probably no because of the weakness of the remedies
available under American law for violations of the associational rights that workers nominally enjoy under the

15. Id. at 17.
16. Id. at 19.
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National Labor Relations Act. 7 To define legal rights as
synonymous with legal outcomes, or even "expected" legal
outcomes, fails adequately to account for the grey areas and
uncertainties that define the ground between what the law
promises (or seems to promise) and what it delivers in fact.
These grey areas and uncertainties are especially large
when it comes to the enforcement of human rights claims.
The international agreements, constitutions and statutes in
which such rights are recognized are frequently drafted in
broad terms, and it generally is accepted that the ways in
which such rights are enforced as well as their substantive
contours are appropriately subject to change over time. The
right to education and the right of association have both
been "backed by legal force" in the United States, but each
in dramatically different ways and to dramatically different
extents over time. The legal enforceability of these rights is
a work in progress, not a checklist item that can be marked
either "yes" or "no."
Another problem with Holmes and Sunstein's distinction between enforceable and unenforceable rights is that it
assumes the only kind of enforcement that can give a right
"teeth" is the kind ordered by a court or other body "whose
decisions are legally binding." In other words, they equate
enforcement of the law with judicial enforcement of the law.
But consider again the South Africa example mentioned at
the beginning of this essay. Prior to the collapse of apartheid there was no domestic law guaranteeing equal rights
to non-white South Africans, and the country had not
assumed any international obligation to guarantee equal
rights to all its citizens. Adopting Holmes and Sunstein's
distinction, we might be able to say that the moral rights of
non-white South Africans were violated by apartheid, but
not their legal rights, since there was no body "whose decisions are legally binding" that could have ordered the end of
apartheid.
But if enforceability is the touchstone that distinguishes "legal" from "moral" rights, why shouldn't we count
as enforcement the actions of the anti-apartheid protest
movement which forced the South African government to
abandon apartheid? Those actions-ranging from petitionUNFAIR
17. See LANCE COMPA,
ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES

STANDARDS (2000).

WORKERS' FREEDOM OF
ADVANTAGE:
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
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signing campaigns to armed struggle-were all taken with
the specific intent of vindicating claims that apartheid violated the human rights of non-white South Africans.
Weren't those claims "enforced" in this instance?
To argue, as legal positivists might, that what the antiapartheid movement did was force a change in the law, creating legal rights where only moral claims had existed
before, is nothing but a linguistic shuffle. The reality is that
non-white South Africans living under apartheid claimed
that they possessed legal rights of a higher order than those
granted by South African law; and when the South African
government refused to recognize those rights, they called
upon supporters of their claims inside and outside South
Africa to enforce their human rights by extra-judicial
means. It took decades, but this "enforcement" action ultimately proved successful. To suggest that the human rights
claims of non-white South Africans were "toothless" because
they were not "backed by the force of law" is simply wrong.
Those claims obviously did have bite. The only credible way
to salvage Holmes and Sunstein's distinction would be to
acknowledge that at least some international human rights
standards are a species of "law" and that the enforcement of
those rights by extra-judicial means is an application of the
"force of law."
Nor is the South African example exceptional. The most
interesting and historically important examples of the vindication of human rights claims have always involved
situations in which popular movements used extra-judicial
means to enforce what they perceived to be a higher species
of law. The American Revolution exemplifies this pattern,
but the same is true of situations in which courts seem to
play the leading role-such as the Brown decisions declaring segregated schools to be unconstitutional in the United
states. First, the Brown decisions themselves would have
been inconceivable without the decades of protest that
preceded them in which the claim was repeatedly advanced
that Jim Crow violated the rights of African Americans, irrespective of what the Supreme Court had said in Plessy.
Second, the degree and manner in which the Brown decisions themselves have been enforced has similarly
depended far more on the politics of civil rights protest and
backlash than it has on court orders. The Brown Court conceded its inability to enforce the rights it recognized by
ordering that school desegregation proceed with "all delib-
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erate speed" rather than immediately-a formulation
essentially the same as the one embodied in the ICESCR.
And the type and extent of desegregation ultimately
"ordered" by the Court was effectively determined by what
the court thought was politically possible. Courts obviously
comprise part of the constellation of forces that determine
the enforceability of particular rights, but they are hardly
the only actors in that drama.
Whatever language we adopt to distinguish between
legal and moral claims or between enforceable and unenforceable claims, the relationship between the categories we
define will be complex. Moral rights are an important
source of legal rights, but it also is true that legal rights
influence the content of moral rights. Indeed, one of the
functions of the creation of legal rights is to influence public
opinion as to what is and is not a moral right. Because of
this interplay, the declaration of a legal right may influence
behavior even if the right is not enforced, and the enforcement of rights by extra-judicial means always supplements
and sometimes supplants their enforcement by the judicial
proceedings we normally associate with the law. Properly
situating human rights in this context is especially challenging because their moral and legal status is likely to be
particularly tangled and the ways in which they are
enforced can and do vary so dramatically. Human rights
comprise a species of law that defies pigeonholing. To be
understood properly, it must be analyzed with this complexity in mind.
IV. WHAT THE NATURAL RIGHTS ARGUMENT DOESN'T

EXPLAIN

The natural rights argument has been expressed in
many forms, but what all forms of the argument share in
common is the assumption that human rights can be discovered-in the will of God, the natural order of things, or a
philosophical argument-rather than having to be created
in real historical time. Therein lies their problem. If no
human agency is required to create human rights (as
opposed to discovering or justifying them) what does it
mean to say that they exist?
Legal positivists have a point. To say that someone has
without citing any tangible evidence of its existence
right
a
other than a well-reasoned argument justifying the right
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leaves us with a pretty empty concept. If human agency is
not required to create human rights, does that mean
humans have always possessed them? Did our hominid
ancestors possess them? Do we now possess human rights
that philosophers have not yet discovered? And how do we
handle the fact that philosophers and theologians disagree
with one another in the justifications they offer for human
rights claims and in the lists of human rights they recognize? Surely one person's belief is not enough to establish
the existence of a human right, but if broad assent or
consensus were required to establish the existence of a particular right, then why isn't it the consensus that creates
the right rather than the justification on which the consensus is based?
To avoid this tangle, perhaps we should acknowledge
that theological and philosophical justifications of
unenforced human rights are not intended to demonstrate
their existence. Instead, they merely justify human institutions or practices grounded on particular human rights
claims (such as the General Assembly's action in adopting
the Universal Declaration). But if that were the case, then
isn't it those institutions and practices which give the rights
their existence rather than the philosopher's endorsement?
Isn't the philosopher's or theologian's contribution merely to
offer an argument supporting the continued existence and
possible expansion of those institutions and practices which
they argue are justified?
If that is our view, then the question we have to answer
in explaining the existence and nature of unenforced
human rights is the following. What institutions and practices are sufficient to support a conclusion that a particular
right exists? This query drives us back in the direction of
the legal positivists' argument, but it doesn't mean we have
to adopt their answer to the question. Perhaps institutions
and practices that fall short of, or at least are different
from, court enforcement (or its administrative equivalent)
should be deemed sufficient to establish the existence of
unenforced rights. The problem is that natural rights theorists have not really tried to answer that question.
In arguing along these lines I am not dismissing the
value of philosophical and theological justifications of
human rights claims. I am simply trying to identify their
proper role in the set of institutions and practices that
actually do explain the existence of human rights. The prac-
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tice of seeking and articulating philosophical or theological
justifications for particular human rights claims may
comprise a key element of the constellatiQn of institutions
and practices that cause the rights to come into existence,
but that doesn't mean those justifications, by themselves,
are capable of creating or even explaining the existence of
the rights.
V. THE CONTOURS OF A BETTER EXPLANATION
This brief assessment of the positivist and natural
rights arguments identifies a similar flaw in each. They
both fail to provide an adequate account of the historical
process that gives rise to human rights claims and the role
such claims actually play in history. To fill that gap I believe three key characteristics of human rights claims need
to be recognized. The first is their aspirational character.
The second is their contingent character. The third is their
evolutionary character. Taken together, these characteristics provide the building blocks of an account of unenforced
human rights that incorporates both the positivist and
natural rights arguments without being constrained by the
limitations of either.
1. Aspirational Law. The most frequently expressed
criticism of economic and social human rights is that they
are mere aspirations to which governments may pay lip
service but have no duty to secure in practice. What these
critics fail to note is that this is true of virtually all human
rights claims when they are first accorded formal recognition.
The uncompromising assertion in the U.S. Declaration
of Independence that "all men are created equal" was
drafted and enacted by slave owners and those willing to
tolerate slavery to achieve their goal of independence from
England. Viewed from this perspective it was a profoundly
hypocritical assertion. Yet on some level Jefferson and his
compatriots probably did believe it was true, and generations of abolitionists and equal rights activists whose belief
in equality was less hypocritical fought to achieve in fact
what Jefferson and the other signers of the Declaration
asserted in principle.
It took nearly 90 years and a civil war to end slavery in
the United States, and the struggle for real equality continues unabated today. Does that mean the Declaration's
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recognition of the inherent equality of all persons was a
meaningless gesture in 1776? Of course not. The formal
recognition accorded the equality principle in the U.S. Declaration of Independence provided both encouragement and
support for the efforts of those who fought to end slaveryas it does the continuing efforts of those who carry on the
fight for equality today. Nor is this an exceptional case.
Purely aspirational assertions like the ones contained in the
U.S. Declaration of Independence commonly play a crucial
role in facilitating the historical changes that lead
gradually to their practical enforcement over time. Indeed,
the aspirational recognition of unenforced rights may be a
necessary stage in their historical development. I would
posit that it is.
It is easy to forget this fact in retrospect. Even the
United States Bill of Rights, which we now think of as fully
enforceable law, lay largely unenforced by the courts until
more than a century after it was formally adopted, and the
Fourteenth Amendment lay similarly dormant as a means
of protecting the rights of African Americans for the better
part of a century after its adoption.
The Universal Declaration is still a young document,
and given the institutional difficulties involved in enforcing
internationally-recognized human rights, it probably will
take much longer for the rights recognized in the Declaration to win effective enforcement than rights recognized in
national constitutions. In the meantime, those who argue
that formal recognition of international human rights
cannot be deemed authoritative until the rights are
enforced in practice do worse than ignore the normal historical process which leads to such enforcement. They offer
support to those seeking to slow or reverse the process.
Imagine a legal positivist carried back in time to the years
immediately following the American Revolution, belittling
Jefferson's language because the rights he asserted were
unenforced-"toothless" as Holmes and Sunstein would say,
rather than an articulation of real rights. That is exactly
the role played by those who belittle the unenforced rights
recognized in the Universal Declaration as not comprising
"real" rights.
Rather than expressing the rules we currently are
willing to live by, human rights norms tend always to
exceed our reach. They are a kind of law by means of which
human societies set goals for themselves. By asserting that
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everyone has these rights, even when we are not prepared
to honor them in practice, we challenge ourselves to live up
to our own aspirations and pre-authorize actions-including
actions that violate existing law-to bring our practice into
compliance with our aspiration. That may not sound like
true law, but given the power of human rights claims to
drive the historical process, it would be foolish to dismiss
human rights proclamations as toothless or lacking in
legitimacy simply because the struggle to enforce them hasa
yet to be won. If the law consists of the rules by which
society regulates the conduct of its members and their
collective institutions, then aspirational law is true law.
The unenforced and possibly unenforceable rights originally
proclaimed in documents like the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights can regulate and direct the
actions of the members of a society just as surely as legal
rights that are routinely enforced by courts of law. We just
have to recognize that the process by which that regulation
occurs may extend over a broad expanse of time with highly
contingent outcomes.
2. Contingent Law. Because of its aspirational nature,
human rights law also has a strongly contingent character.
To appreciate just how contingent, we must consider the life
cycle of a human rights claim beginning well before it is
formally recognized in documents like the Universal Declaration. The true origins of human rights claims lie beyond
our capacity to document historical events. Consider, for
example, where the idea originated that all persons have a
right to life. Who was the first person to perceive a generalized injustice in the arbitrary taking of another's life and
form the idea that people have (or should have) both a right
to be free of such interference and a duty to respect the
same right in others? We will never know. An act of abuse
or interference inspires resentment, and resentment seeks
justification in the notion that a wrong has been committed.
"It's not fair." Even four-year olds pop out with it.
It is easy to imagine this happening over and over again
without any impact on history; but it also is easy to imagine
such ideas attracting broader support among groups of people whose circumstances caused them to suffer the same
type of abuse or interference. Conversely, those who
committed the abuses in question would have sought to
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justify their own actions-either to vindicate themselves in

their own eyes or to silence the grumblings of their victims.
In this way theories of special privilege probably emerged
simultaneously, even symbiotically, with claims of violated
rights. The difference is that the justifications of special
privilege were articulated by the powerful and hence were
backed by the full weight of the economic, political and
religious power they controlled. The predictable result
would normally be the suppression of incipient claims of
generalized or universal (i.e., human) rights.
Only in exceptional circumstances would these claims
command the tangible support necessary to be voiced in
historically noticeable ways. This kind of support was
probably first provided by dissenting religious movements
operating in periods of political upheaval. This is one
reason so many human rights claims were first expressed in
religious terms. The so-called "diggers" movement that
arose during the English Civil War provides a textbook
example of this phenomenon. A bankrupt merchant, Gerard
Winstanley, became the spokesperson for this quasireligious movement of radical "levellers." Believing that the
upper classes had usurped the right of all persons (including men and women equally) to both rule themselves and
claim equal access to the land, Winstanley led and encouraged groups of poor people to establish communist
settlements on common lands in defiance of English law
(but in accord with what they claimed was a higher law)."8
18. See, e.g., GERARD WINSTANLEY ET AL., THE TRUE LEVELLERS' STANDARD
(1649), reprinted in COUNTER-TRADITION: A READER IN THE
LITERATURE OF DISSENT AND ALTERNATIVES, at 70-71 (Sheila Delany
ed., 1971):
In the beginning of Time, the great Creator Reason, made the Earth
to
be a Common Treasury, to preserve Beasts, Birds, Fishes, and Man,
the Lord that was to govern this Creation; for Man had Domination
given to him, over the beasts, Birds, and Fishes; but not one word was
spoken in the beginning, That one branch of mankind should rule over
another.
And the Reason is this, Every single man, Male and Female, is
a
perfect Creature of himself; and the same Spirit that made the Globe,
dwells in man to govern the Globe; so that the flesh of man being
subject to Reason, his Maker, hath him to be his Teacher and Ruler
within himself, therefore needs not run abroad after any Teacher
and
Ruler without him, for he needs not that any man should teach him,
for
the same Anointing that ruled in the Son of man, teacheth him
all
things.
But since human flesh (that king of Beasts) began to delight himself
in the objects of the Creation, more than in the Spirit Reason and
ADVANCED
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These settlements survived less than a year, and the
economic rights Winstanley advocated are still strongly
contested, but his advocacy of the right of all persons to rule
themselves has fared better over time.
This illustrates another key feature of the life cycle of
human rights claims. Particular claims do not take hold in
a society and become institutionalized unless they serve the
interests and attract the enduring support of strategically
powerful interest groups. In the period following the
English Civil War, John Locke emphatically and expressly
rejected Winstanley's claim that all members of society
retained an equal right to the land. On the other hand he
endorsed crucial aspects of Winstanley's claim that all
persons possess the same natural 9capacities and retain the
same right to rule themselves. In articulating these
positions Locke famously represented the interests of the
emergent bourgeoisie which wanted to establish its equal
right to rule with the nobility but just as clearly did not
want to acknowledge any right on the part of the lower
orders of society to share the land of the wealthy.
My point is that human rights law is contingent, but its
development is not arbitrary. It follows many twists and
turns over time, but it also reflects the influence of the
same historical forces that drive other institutional
developments in society. It is aspirational, but not all aspirations are achievable in a particular historical context, It
is simultaneously a powerful force in history and a product
of history.
Righteousness .... then he fell into blindness of mind and weakness of
heart, and runs abroad for a Teacher and Ruler: And so selfish
imaginations... working with Covetousness, did set up one man to
teach and rule over another; and thereby the Spirit was killed, and
man was brought into bondage, and became a greater Slave to such of
his own kind, than the Beasts of the field were to him.
And hereupon, the Earth (which was made to be a Common Treasury
of relief for all, both Beasts and Men) was hedged into inclosures by the
teachers and rulers, and the others were made Servants and Slaves:
And the Earth that is within this Creation made a Common Storehouse
for all, is bought and sold, and kept in the hands of a few, whereby the
great Creator is mightily dishonored, as if he were a respecter of
persons, delighting in the comfortable Livelihoods of some, and
rejoicing in the miserable poverty and straits of others. From the
beginning it was not so.
19. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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3. Evolutionary Law. The last characteristic of human
rights law that I want to note is its evolutionary nature. It
is a type of law that builds on itself in a distinctive way. I
have emphasized that human rights claims aspire to
achieve goals which, as a practical matter, may not be
within political reach when the claims are first advanced
and even when they first win general acceptance. Certainly
this was true of the equal rights principle embraced by
Americans in their Declaration of Independence. Yet over
time, bits and pieces of an articulated human right often
are secured, and as that happens two things occur. First,
the possibility of securing more aspects of the right also
expands. The abolition of slavery was necessary before the
goal of securing equal voting right could even be approached. This is an obvious and unremarkable characteristic of all historical change. The second thing that happens
when rights are partially secured is that the aspirations
embodied in the right tend to expand. People reconceive the
practical policy goals embodied in the right, raising their
sights in a way that always leaves the right beyond their
grasp. In other words, the right remains aspirational.
Consider for example the right of all persons to an education referenced in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration.
This right achieved widespread acceptance and also began
to be enforced in the northern United States during the
second quarter of the 19th century (after having been
strongly advocated in earlier years by people like George
Washington and Thomas Jefferson). As conceived at the
time, however, the right to education embodied only a
limited entitlement to primary schooling with no implication that the poor were entitled to equal educational opportunity with the wealthy. In the South, because of slavery,
even this limited entitlement was not recognized until after
the Civil War. Nevertheless, building on the achievements
of early public school advocates like Horace Mann, the
aspirations embodied in the right to education steadily
expanded over time. The right gradually came to be seen as
including access to higher levels of education and an entitlement to equal educational opportunity. Presumably it
will continue to expand as our aspirations expand. That
tendency is inherent in the nature of human rights and
guarantees that they will always remain controversial.
This constant "raising of the bar" prevents human
rights from ever being fully enforced. Indeed, I would posit
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that a right which is fully and routinely enforced should no
longer be categorized as a "human right" because it no
longer performs the essential function of this species of law.
That is, it no longer challenges society to do more than it
currently is willing to do to protect fundamental entitlements. Rights that are so widely accepted that violators are
viewed as social deviants are rarely referred to as human
rights, because they do not possess the oppositional character of human rights and do not require the exceptional
enforcement measures required to secure human rights. I
am not suggesting that all aspects of a particular human
right must remain unenforced for the right to be viewed as
a genuine human right, only that the right must be perceived as encompassing unmet goals. It must remain a
work in progress rather than a finished project.
VI. WHAT ARE HuMAN RIGHTS AND WHERE DO THEY COME
FROM?

This inquiry leads me to suggest the following set of
propositions as a substitute for both the positivist and
natural rights explanations of human rights.
(1) Humans do not possess any inherent rights. Human
rights must be asserted and claimed to come into existence.
The philosophical or theological rationales commonly
offered to justify the existence of human rights may justify
an assertion that a particular right exists, but without that
assertion the justification is not capable of either creating
the right or verifying that it exists.
(2) On the other hand, human rights do not have to be
enforced by judicial or administrative bodies to exist. They
are not the same thing as "legal rights" in the positivist
sense of the term, although human rights can also be legal
rights in that sense if they achieve enforcement by judicial
and administrative bodies.
(3) Human rights are a form of aspirational law by
means of which humans establish goals for themselves concerning the kinds of species they are committed to becoming
(a species that respects these rights) and the kind of societies they are committed to creating (the kind of societies
that secure and protect these rights).
(4) The positive acts required to create human rights
consist of an accumulation of individual acts of acceptance
(individual assertions that the rights at issue are or should
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be human rights) and of advocacy (through actions designed
to win enforcement of the rights). These acts of individual
acceptance and advocacy normally culminate in broadly
accepted collective assertions of the existence of the right in
manifestos, declarations, constitutions or agreements.
(5) It is impossible to determine the exact point in time
a human rights claim becomes a genuine human right,
because the characteristic feature of its achieving that
status consists of a process of acceptance rather than a
discrete legislative, judicial or administrative act; but the
sine quo non of that status is broad acceptance of the right
combined with practical advocacy that has some impact on
historical events.
(6) The enforcement of a particular human right can be
achieved by any of the means by which historical change is
accomplished in human societies-from violent rebellion
and a radical restructuring of social institutions to gradual
changes in attitude achieved through educational initiatives.
(7) The success of efforts to enforce human rights is
highly contingent and is influenced by all the factors that
drive or restrain historical change in general. Consequently, some human rights will be easier to secure than
others during particular historical eras.
(8) Efforts to secure particular human rights have many
way stations but no real terminus, because the aspirational
character of the rights gives them a natural tendency to
expand over time.
(9) The struggle for human rights is a struggle to shape
the human identity and the course of human history. It is
not predicated on a denial of either our natural behavioral
tendencies as a species or the constraining effect of existing
natural and institutional realities. It merely recognizes that
humans have the capacity to shape their own preferences,
discipline their own behavior, and shape the social institutions that regulate their everyday life. In other words, we
have the capacity, within bounds, to create our own future.
This is what makes human rights so distinctively human.
(10) Given the aspirational role human rights play in
human societies, the category is best reserved (and in practice generally is reserved) for claims that are not yet fully or
adequately enforced. Human rights law is aspirational law.
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APPENDIX

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
a
by vote of 48 to 0 with 8 abstentions on Dec. 10, 1948

Article 22
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national
effort and international co-operation and in accordance with
the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his
dignity and the free development of his personality.
Article 23
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and
to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right
to equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and
favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care
and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widow-
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hood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special
care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall
be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages.
Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available
and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit.
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development
of the human personality and to the strengthening of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It
shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship
among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of
education that shall be given to their children.
Article 27
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and 'to
share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary
*or artistic production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

